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From liberal to predatory mass media in 
post-communist Lithuania
Referring to the concepts, communicative democracy is defined as free, open 
and democratic communication organized around three equally legitimate public 
sphere actors – politicians, journalists and public opinion, and populism is under-
stood as good, entertaining and effective communication with people, eroding 
basic functions of the political parties (institutionalization of ideological con-
flicts) and politicians (representation), the paper provides insights about the dan-
gers to quality of democracy if the free mass media gets utterly away from political 
parallelism. Special attention is placed on the tendencies of media personnel to 
be active in the political life. The paper conceptualizes a tremendous decrease 
(by one third) in public trust in mass media in Lithuania, observed from 1998 to 
2009 and interprets this change as a cumulative result of the post-communist ill-
structured political field under pressing liberalization and democratization cou-
pled with specific patterns of the Lithuanian political culture and public sphere. 
In the conditions of a still relatively high public trust in mass-media and scarce 
foreign ownership of the mass-media outlets in Lithuania, the local media barons 
are able to produce and impose their own public-agenda. The Lithuanian mass-
media and government relations evolve along the lines of the zero-sum game: they 
seek to control each other, and at the same time try to avoid being controlled by 
the other, while any other pattern of inter-relations does not appear as viable and 
appropriate. INTUNE project survey (2009) shows that the media elite’s influence 
in the national decision making process is significantly higher in Lithuania than, 
for instance, in Germany or Hungary. 
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Introduction
The paper firstly addresses developments of the multi-party system 
and of the free mass media in post-communist Lithuania as two parallel 
processes, which intersection or overlap (political parallelism) at the be-
ginning of the Independent statehood was very strongly pronounced and 
biased towards the political agenda of national revival, later on it became 
more polarized, but was temporary and partial and since 1995–1996 be-
came erratic and irrelevant as such, giving a vast leeway to the commer-
cial drives of media and populist parlance in the public sphere. Special 
attention is paid to dynamics (tremendous decrease) of the public trust 
in the late post-communist mass-media. With a reference to the concept 
of communicative democracy (defined as free, open and democratic com-
munication organized around three equally legitimate public sphere ac-
tors – politicians, journalists and public opinion [Jakubowicz, 2005] and 
populism understood as entertaining communication with people, erod-
ing basic functions of the political parties (to institutionalize ideological 
conflicts) and politicians (to represent voters), I argue that there is a dan-
ger to quality of democracy when the free mass media gets utterly away 
from political parallelism. 
Presence of journalists and writers in the Lithuanian Seimas was 
constantly going down from 10,5% in 1990 to 3,5% in 2008 what shows 
strengthening independent mass media. Interestingly, Rimvydas Valatka, 
the MP of the founding parliament 1990–1992, one of the founders of 
the Liberal party in post-communist Lithuania actually is an influen-
tial public figure who holds a position of vice-editor of Lietuvos rytas, 
the Lithuanian daily with the highest circulation and since 2005 he also 
is an editor in-chief of the Internet news portal www.lrytas.lt. It should 
be noted that in 1990 elected parliament (only) every tenth MP has had 
some prior experience from the private sector (meanwhile, majority of 
MPs were not entrepreneurs in the strict sense of the term). Every second 
of these path-breaking politicians (7) was a journalist acting under the 
private ownership law of recently liberalized mass media. In retrospec-
tive, the occupational category of MPs former writers and journalists in 
1990 thus was the most polarized in terms of public vs. private ownership 
over all the post-communist parliamentary terms. Twenty years after, in 
2008 elected Seimas only 5 former journalists are in the parliamentary 
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elite and none of them has any experience in the privately owned media. 
Therefore, divorce of the media and political personnel in post-commu-
nist Lithuania might be considered over and it bluntly favors the ex-part-
ners from media. 
The Lithuanian scholarship about relations of the mass-
media and politics 
The country-case analysis is important and vital in order to under-
stand the post-communist journalism. After all, “Like sailing, gardening, 
politics and poetry, journalism is a craft of place; it works by the light of 
local knowledge. (…). This localism, even ethnocentrism, can be diffe-
rently rendered. We can mean we members of a congregation, practitio-
ners of a craft, possessors of a common race, gender, ethnicity, but most 
often, it refers to ‘we fellow citizens’ of a country, state, or region” [Carey, 
2007, p. 4]. 
Political scientists Krupavičius and Šarkutė say that in 1990–1991 the 
Lithuanian mass media experienced a rapid process of desovietization, 
which in essence meant that the Soviet nomenklatura lost ability to use 
the media as an influential instrument of the communist propaganda 
[Krupavičius and Šarkutė, 2004, p. 156]. After the breakdown of the com-
munist rule, the media people emerged as practitioners of free and inde-
pendent reporting and presentation. To Krupavičius and Šarkutė further 
developments in the field of mass media in post-communist Lithuania 
show evolving democratization of the political-cultural life and on the 
whole are to be interpreted along the lines of the democratic media suc-
cess story (for instance, relatively high public trust in mass media, if com-
pared to other public institutions such as a parliament, government or 
courts, active commercial radio and TV stations, as well as mushrooming 
internet news portals [Ibid, p. 151–155]. According to the authors, the 
only challenge for the post-communist Lithuanian mass-media yet to be 
dealt with is related to the demographically small population (with a pe-
culiar language) and a relatively weak economy of the country. 
Another media specialist Balčytienė puts forward a similar short-cut-
ting revolutionary model of the post-communist mass media democra-
tization: “After the restoration of independence in the beginning of the 
1990s, the most important goal for the Lithuanian media was to elimi-
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nate censorship. (…) journalists [started] (…) to work under conditions 
of freedom of speech” [Balčytienė, 2006, p. 172]. However, the author rec-
ognizes that in the post-communist Lithuania media-politics-economy 
domain several idiosyncratic solutions with lasting (negative) effects have 
been adopted. The most critical tasks for the Lithuanian media are yet 
to be accomplished “[media] should define itself as a public socialization 
venue in a market driven society. (…) journalism has to change from a 
purely commercial phenomenon into a societal in scope” [ibid, p. 174]. 
Yet, the author evaluates (highly) positively the media performance in 
the process of democratization of the country: “Media plays the role of 
a watchdog and functions as a public eye” [ibid, p. 174]. However, the 
author does not provide any convincing case of such a role performance. 
Perhaps, it would be more adequate to claim that compared to the prom-
ising institutionalization of the media as a true Fourth Estate, playing a 
watchdog role and consistently offering its audiences a balanced, fair, fact-
based journalism devoid of the journalists’ opinions and advocacy, epito-
mized by Pravo and Mlada Dnes in the Czech republic, Nepszabadszag in 
Hungary, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita in Poland and Adevarul in 
Romania [Gross, 2004, p.123], the Lithuanian media panorama ingenu-
ously lacks precedents of that sort. Balčytienė’s account of the post-com-
munist improvements in the democratic workings of the media is based 
on her (erroneous) normative stance, which holds that “liberal media 
model (…) transferring information encourages discussions that form 
public opinion and influence the actions of citizens” [Balčytienė, 2006, 
p. 173]. As if any transfer of information encourages discussions, and as if 
any discussion leads to the collective action… The author fails to address 
the issue that “the essence of democratization are the value orientations 
and habitual processes that underline changes in the political, social, eco-
nomic, and professional cultures and the evolution of vital civil societies. 
(…) Absent simultaneous systemic and cultural transformations, we are 
left with the phenomenon of a democratic civic masquerade, meaning 
the attempt to suggest the real existence of civic commitment and demo-
cratic practice through the fulfillment of merely formal criteria” [Lemke 
quoted in Gross, 2004, p. 113–114]. 
Social critic Bielinis in scholarly publications describes the global 
phenomenon of mediacracy and reveals its facets in post-communist 
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Lithuania. Political parties or any other units with political ambitions, 
based on the organized communities (staff of newspapers, TVs or ra-
dio, NGOs, trade unions, associations, etc.) are absent from his analysis. 
Bielinis addresses macro processes and tendencies (electoral and public 
relations campaigns) and extensively uses observations of the public be-
havior and illustrations from publications of individual journalists and 
politicians: “politicians use services of the mass-media and clenching 
one’s teeth put up with its critiques, because it looks like it has ambition 
to be the First Estate” [Bielinis 2005, p. 11]. Bielinis does not attribute 
this trend to any particularity of the Lithuanian political culture or to its 
political and cultural elites, but rather views it as resulting from the very 
phenomenon of mass communication. Political communicative practices 
render political parties as member-based-organizations irrelevant, and 
foster images of their leadership, thus promoting their emotional appeal 
to the audience. Bielinis shows that the upper-hand in communicative 
battles always belongs to the mass-media rather than to the political elite 
of late post-communist Lithuania: “Lithuanian viewer/reader most often 
treats mass-media as a counter-politics. When it appears that the politi-
cians’ actions and decisions do not yield expected results, (…) then the 
mass-media become the last instance of hope” [Ibid, p. 61]. Bielinis goes 
as far as to generalize (regretfully, without identifying anything or pro-
viding any empirical test) that “Many mass-media outlets in Lithuania do 
not play the role of the intermediary between the politics and citizens and 
turn themselves into the independent anarchistic political subject, pursu-
ing narrow, selfish, often purely economic purposes, further advancing 
illusion about the political transparency and impartiality of mass-media” 
[Ibid, p. 61]. Newspapers and TV channels become erzac-parties with-
out ideology and without any positive idea [Ibid, p. 64]. Journalists in 
the times of self-politization of mass media and in front of its self-inte-
rests, start to a greater extent talk only on their own behalf. According to 
Bielinis, talking on behalf of the society or community becomes only a 
formal screen in the pursuit of particular (personal or group) interests of 
the mass media elite (ratings, profits and handy economic and political 
decisions [Ibid, p. 66]. 
The three “schools” described above provide differing and comple-
mentary approaches to the post-communist mass media in Lithuania. 
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2009 No. 2
14
Macro-political reading [Krupavičius and Šarkutė, 2004] shows the 
“history written by the winners” and leads to optimistic democratic 
conclusions and further democracy enhancing expectations. The civic 
masquerade approach [Balčytienė, 2006] leans to a somewhat more nu-
anced and socially embedded understanding of an un-easy role played 
by mass-media in their pursuit of commercial success and democratic 
quality. Finally, the journalistic corporatism and mediacracy approach 
[Bielinis, 2005] gives practically no hope about mass media as a provider 
of civic, empowering and enlightening solutions for readers and view-
ers. Meanwhile, none of the above presented approaches, prominently 
practiced in the Lithuanian academic research, does not center on mass 
media and power (political) elite relations as an important background 
and context, shaping both phenomena and affecting the political (civic) 
culture and public opinion in the country. 
An excursus into Soviet times 
When Lithuania in 1940 was occupied by the USSR, the media under-
went revolutionary changes. The structure of mass media ownership and 
management changed (many inter-war Lithuanian editors and journa-
lists, were deported to Siberia or emigrated to the West). The ideological 
profile of media was monopolized by the Communist party. Readership 
of newspapers exploded (due to state subsidies and wide proletariat lite-
racy programs). Only the language of mass-media (the Lithuanian) has 
been kept intact, although the Russian language periodicals and pro-
grams have been introduced (yet, the Russian language media outlets 
throughout the Soviet period remained of secondary importance). The 
Communist media was supposed to be unambiguously serious and its 
eventual entertainment services were regarded as bourgeois leftovers or 
results of the Western conspiracies. Only in late 1970s–80s leisure themes 
and subjects started being diffused and tolerated (by the national nomen-
klaturas [Šepetys, 2005]. Sustained propaganda was the principal goal of 
the in mass media throughout the whole Soviet times. The Communist 
media with its presumed superior knowledge and a high social status (yet, 
without any means of free expression) educated, informed and served 
“progressive social interests”. 
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Education (the Communist indoctrination) of journalists in the Soviet 
times was of primary importance and the powerful concept of intelligent-
sia was at its foundation. Censorship and self-censorship assured a rather 
smooth fulfillment of the propagandistic media function. Interestingly, 
the Soviet audience was understood as totally undifferentiated (i.e. very 
much interested in Moscow led high politics) and at the same time excee-
dingly fragmented (all-union, republican, regional, local press in various 
formats had very wide currency, socio-professionally shaped and hobby 
linked reviews have been cooked up). The Soviet mass media audience 
indeed was practically confined to the Communist party members and 
the working class. The dissident press (i.e. famous Lithuanian Catholic 
Church Chronicles, 1972-1989) and the foreign radio programs (Radio 
Free Europe, Radio liberty, Voice from Washington, etc.) with their grace-
less critics of the Communist regime neither have had free circulation, 
nor enjoyed big audiences. Yet, in Lithuania (as in some places elsewhere 
in the USSR) the Soviet mass media itself managed to voice the misdeeds 
of the rank and file officials, to raise problems of preservation of cultural 
heritage, environmental protection, to express workplace moderniza-
tion-driven ideas, etc. The daily Komjaunimo tiesa in 1983–1989 used 
to organize highly prestigious School of Young Journalists’ where the 
high school students from all over Lithuania aspiring to the journalism 
studies at Vilnius university, could gather for the club-like activities (meet-
ing famous journalists, writing reports, editing programs, getting famil-
iar with the journalistic craft and etc.)2. The Soviet mass media therefore 
in Lithuania had an important place in the pre- or para-political domain, 
which aired social and cultural topics having to do with common interest 
and/or collective identities [Jakubowicz, 2005, p. 155–156]. 
When Gorbachev initiated Glasnost’, the mass-media freed itself from 
ideological taboos and became an iconic public institution. In Lithuania, 
in the pinnacle year of the Glasnost’, subscription to Komjaunimo tiesa 
grew five times: from 108,000 copies in 1988 to 522,000 in 1989. The 
weekly Gimtasis kraštas, which was aimed at Lithuanians living abroad 
but was widely read in the country as well, as early as in 1988 published 
2 The author of this paper herself was enrolled into this School in 1985–1986, when it was led 
by Vitas Lingys, the then Komjaunimo tiesa journalist, turned to be the co-founder of the 
Respublika daily in 1989, and he was murdered by the mafia in 1993 because of his investigative 
journalism reports about the criminal facets of rampant privatization in the country. 
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the text of the Lithuanian National Anthem Tautiška giesmė, which 
has been banned for five decades. The editor-in-chief of the weekly, 
Algimantas Čekuolis, became a popular public figure, turned out to be 
one of the leading figures of the Sąjūdis movement and was elected to 
the Constituent Seimas in 1990. On 16 September 1989, the new daily 
Respublika was launched. It was established as a partisan newspaper of 
Sąjūdis, the enterprising, ambitious and motivated journalists composed 
its editorial and managerial board. In 1989 a group of resourceful fellows 
in Vilnius opened radio station M1, and this was the first private broad-
cast station in the Baltic States. 
The journalists and the media became heroes of the day, the power of 
print and broadcast media was recognized, the public space exploded, act-
ing as a facilitator and a consolidating agency, the mass media raised polit-
ical issues and mobilized society around the most urgent political and so-
cial topics [Balčytienė, 2006, p. 78]. However, the democratic and national 
awakening was taking place in the context of weak political pluralism, 
ailing tolerance and social trust, parochial personification of the political 
field and low sense of citizens’ responsibility [Senn, 1997]. Nevertheless, 
the Singing revolution in Lithuania was decidedly successful. Its victory 
testifies once again to the axiom, broadly discussed in the democratiza-
tion literature: “Democratic culture is certainly not a precondition for the 
initiation to democracy” [Diamond, 1994, p. 239]. In addition, most media 
scholars see not internal, but rather external factors driving the post-com-
munist changes, namely “political, economic and technological factors, as 
well as internationalization and globalization affect the evolution of the 
transformation. The Eastern European media systems were transformed 
to resemble those in the West” [Gross, 2004, p. 114]. 
From media consecrating events in January 99 to its 
commercialization 
“The transition from communist media, and from underground 
or alternative media where they existed, was achieved almost instant-
ly at the moment the communist regimes disappeared, and the trans-
formation began simultaneously with that occurrence” [Gross, 2004, 
p. 114]. The new Law on the Press and Other Mass Media was one of the 
first to be drafted by the Constituent Assembly, after it proclaimed the 
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Lithuanian independence on March 11, 1990. The founding post-com-
munist Lithuanian legislators (among them, as it was hinted above, were 
numerous influential journalists) cherished the idea that the State should 
play an active role in the matters of mass media. For a small country 
in the insecure geopolitical and cultural environment, the Law made it 
impossible for foreign citizens to set up a newspaper or broadcast station 
in Lithuania. In Lithuania, in line with the transformation observed all 
over the Eastern Europe, in 1990 the one-party media system suddenly 
became a multiparty media system. 
At the same time, the Lithuanian journalists tried to establish their 
professional community along the lines of a non-governmental organiza-
tion. These initiatives, supposedly signaling of the incremental transfor-
mations of the relations between mass-media and politics and their re-
spective representatives in the public space, in post-communist Lithuania 
were taking place amidst intensive Vilnius-Moscow political tensions. 
Early 1991 saw Soviet soldiers’ and Lithuanian civilians’ bloodshed in the 
attempted coup d’etat in Vilnius. On January 11, 1991 the Press house 
in Vilnius has been occupied by the Soviet military and a temporary go-
vernment led by Moscow loyal communists was proclaimed in Lithuania. 
The Lithuanian population mobilized itself to defend freedom and inde-
pendence. On January 12, 1991 the first issue of Laisva Lietuva, prepared 
under joint efforts of thirteen editorial boards was published. It described 
the Soviet soldiers’ assault against Lithuanian journalists and publishers. 
Late at night January 13, 1991 the national TV station has been occupied 
by the Soviet military. Yet, heroically just a few minutes after the closure 
of the Vilnius TV station, the Kaunas radio and Kaunas TV station start-
ed their national broadcasting in Lithuanian and English. Kaunas radio 
signals reached Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, and then the satel-
lite connection started transmitting the news to the whole world. One day 
later, the communication services from the USSR managed to block the 
Lithuanian radio signals emitted to the USA. The Kaunas broadcast could 
only reach Central European and Scandinavian countries. The broadcast 
blockade has been breached on January 25, 1991 when a temporary satel-
lite broadcast station has been established in the Parliamentary building, 
in Vilnius. About 200 foreign journalists have been working in January 
1991 in Lithuania. 
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These were heydays of the Lithuanian national unity and its freedom 
devoted mass media. After the Moscow led adversary attacks against the 
independent Lithuania failed in late winter 1991, “things got back to nor-
mal”. However, the mass-media carved for itself a terrific niche in the 
Lithuanian collective memory, it entered the social elites and in the pub-
lic opinion. Interpretations of the exceptionally high lasting public trust 
in mass media in Lithuania (although systematically measured only since 
1996) unequivocally relate this phenomenal trust to the excellent media 
performance in January 1991 and to the symbolic role of martyr it was 
assigned by the ultimate Soviet aggressors. 
However, the political devotion for civic freedom and the Lithuanian 
State prestige in the world of the Lithuanian mass media in early 90ies, 
changed its course in the following years. Engaged multi-partyism was 
short in Lithuanian media; it disappeared by the mid-1990s and was 
replaced by more autonomous, if not politically independent, media. 
Newspapers lost their decidedly partisan orientation; public broadcast-
ing continued to be manipulated (if not controlled) by governments, and 
the rest of the predominantly commercial broadcast outlets became en-
tertainment oriented and generally politically biased in their news and 
public affairs coverage. 
The Lithuanian media from an agent of political resistance (1988–
1990) has moved in the direction of the ostensibly commercial product. 
The free market laws entered the alleged free expression domain. Now, a 
new danger has appeared because the media started creating the national 
agenda not in public, but in their own commercial interest [Balčytienė, 
2006, p. 58]. 
The number of newspaper titles in Lithuania rose sharply in 1990–
1992 and assured its enormous diversity (in 1995 reaching its ever at-
tained peak of 477 newspaper titles). Alongside, the radio and TV market 
unwrapped. New radio stations aired their music, sports, (Catholic) re-
ligion and political information related programs. On April 11, 1993 the 
first private Tele3 was aired. Professor Liucija Baškauskaitė (a charisma-
tic Lithuanian–American cultural anthropologist, who became famous 
after her heroic performance at Kaunas TV, broadcasting the January 
1991 events to the whole world, CNN included), was one of its founders 
and feature personalities [Pečiulis, 2007, p. 134]. In 1994, another com-
mercial TV channel LNK (Laisvas ir Nepriklausomas kanalas, Free and 
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Independent channel) has been established by the Lithuanian show-biz 
stars (sold it to the Lithuanian investors MG Baltic in 2003). Yet one more 
TV channel BTV (Baltijos TV, the Baltic TV) was established in Klaipėda 
(nearby the sea region) region in 1993 (sold to the Lithuania Achema in-
vestment group in 2004). 
Hence, the diversification of media was huge at the outset of the post-
communist period in Lithuania. Based on inherited from the Soviet re-
gime high readership tradition and patterns of wide newspaper circula-
tion combined with the unleashed free market forces, vigorous political 
(party) competition, hearty newly born public figures and media celebri-
ties and hugely symbolic new media initiating events the unprecedented 
expansion of mass-media operated in early post-communist Lithuania, 
displaying its overtly liberal character. 
Mass media in late 990s: down-to-earth and towards 
corporatism cum populism 
Developments of the multi-party system and of the free mass media 
in Lithuania observably intersected at the beginning of the post-com-
munist Independent statehood and were very strongly biased towards 
the political agenda of national revival. Later on, the overlap between the 
media and politics became more polarized (nationalist-conservative vs. 
liberal vs. social-democratic). Yet, it was short-lived and partial; and since 
around 1996 (we take the third parliamentary elections as our reference 
point) became erratic and irrelevant as such, giving a vast leeway to the 
commercial drives of media and populist parlance in the public sphere. 
Because of the declining public interest and economic recession in 
1996, the circulation of newspapers and journals in Lithuania started to 
go down. The downward tendencies have been aggravated by the 1998 
economic backlash in Russia – the newspapers in Lithuania became pro-
hibitively expensive for majority of population. Several dailies set up their 
thematic weekly supplements to keep their readership loyal and satisfied 
with aesthetic and lighthearted contents. A new wave of diversification 
of the press operates in Lithuania since 2003, with expanding Internet 
portals cross-ownership on broadcast and print media and the Internet 
[Balčytienė, 2006, p. 119]. Balčytienė while discussing the eventual ef-
fects of the increasing mass-media outlets cross-ownership (on one hand, 
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higher potential of better journalistic quality and, on the other hand, dan-
ger of triggering the down-market trends) tends to diagnose the second 
one: while most of the media aim at the mass market, they follow a trend 
towards the homogenization of contents [Ibid, p. 119]. Homogenization 
coincides with the trends in global media, where commercial values and 
practices of the Liberal Model, described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
are perceived to operate as norms (since a larger market share means 
more money, the commercial press tries to reach out the mass audience 
across political lines).
Meanwhile, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe, in the Liberal 
model, not only higher salaries, but also superior ethical practices of jour-
nalists may be enhanced by the mechanisms of self-regulation of the pro-
fession. In line with this reasoning, in 1996 a new law regulating the Mass 
media was adopted in Lithuania, and the state control was removed, and 
the self-regulation of media was introduced. It copied the model of self-
regulation from the analogous Swedish institutions and established the 
Inspector of Journalist Ethics and the Ethics Commission of Journalists 
and Publishers. In Lithuania, the state intervention in the matters of mass 
media was dramatically restricted. The role of the state is confined to 
monitor the public information policy and to promote such abstract va-
lues as transparency and equal opportunities. Very liberal media regu-
lation and a prominent role assigned to the free mass media in public 
authority and power shaping have been enhanced. Journalists, according 
to the Lithuanian Code of ethics, should not work on behalf of authori-
ties, private structures, or individuals. According to the Lithuanian Law, 
if a source of information requests to preserve the secret of its name, the 
journalist in no case is allowed to reveal it. The international experts have 
concluded that Lithuania has the most liberal post-soviet law regarding 
media regulation.
Thus, after the introduction of the well-intended Law of Media self-
regulation and sobering readership reduction in late 90ties, the free mass 
media in Lithuania functions as a value-in-itself and is rather deaf to ex-
ternal (civic) criticism. Media practices its self-regulation not to enhance 
professionalism, but to defend ‘the profession’. Bielinis writes about per-
verse corporatism of journalists in Lithuania: “In support to each other, 
the journalists pay little attention to the problems arising inside the mass-
media. For instance, journalistic reaction to the ethics of politicians and 
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journalists: it suffice a small faux pas of a politician, and he/she is accused, 
and, on the contrary, a journalist has to constantly and steadily ‚commit 
sins‘ to get mass-media report on him/her or briefly mention him/her as 
some sort of misunderstanding” [Bielinis, 2005, p. 78]. The case in point 
might be the series of anti-Semitic publications in Respublika daily in 
early 2004, which attracted attention and indignation of international 
media and human rights experts, but were rather vaguely discussed in 
the Lithuanian media (the daily Lietuvos rytas, the main Respublika rival 
in the press market, did not seize this “civic opportunity” to publically 
criticize its competitor!). 
Provision of information is considered an economic activity, and the 
Lithuanian Law on Competition regulates the competition between the 
media. It uses the concept of the ‘dominant position’ and in principle does 
not allow any entity to have more that 40 per cent of the market. However, 
the experts agree that in small media markets, the media concentration is 
inevitable and in Lithuania the Lietuvos rytas and Respublikos grupe, two 
publishing houses well-established in the country market, give evidence 
that the newspaper market is an oligopoly in Lithuania. It seems that the 
control of the press by a small number of local media barons in Lithuania 
(contrary to Latvia and Estonia or Hungary) was not a temporary devi-
ance provoked by a small market. Indeed, the local barons’ phenomenon 
invalidates the arguments put forward by Krupavičius and Šarkutė (see 
above) about a sheer macro-structural impossibility to create readership 
and editorial loyalties and identities in small press markets. 
The broadcast market in post-communist Lithuania is still expand-
ing: in 2000 there were 29 radio broadcasters and they are 47 in 2009; re-
spectively cable TV grew from 47 to 55 operators, MDTV (MMDS) from 
3 to 4 operators and TV from 21 in 2000 to 31 broadcasters (7 national) 
[Veidas, 2009.11.09, p. 6]. The broadcast market in Lithuania has a pe-
culiar entity called the Lithuanian National radio and television (LRT), 
which is meant to be the Public broadcaster. The LRT runs several ra-
dio and TV programs. The LRT has a supreme regulating body, the LRT 
Council. The LRT Council is rickety and during 16 years the LRT outlived 
as many as 14 general directors. An obvious intrusion of politicians into 
the work of LRT is confirmed by the fact that LRT managers leave their 
position due to political reasons [Balčytienė, 2006, p. 83]. However, in re-
lation to the LRT organizational developments and the very notion Public 
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broadcaster, perhaps not only pernicious roles of the politicians have to 
be discussed. The commercial TVs and radios are in prickly competition 
with the LRT over audience and income. In late 2006 the Constitutional 
Court came forward with a Salomon’s decision that commercial public-
ity is compatible with the Public Broadcast Television, since it assures 
the financial TV independence from the government (politicians) and 
provides equal market competition opportunities vis-à-vis commercial 
stations. Whether it is the best recipe to serve the public interest remains 
a rhetorical question. 
The Lithuanian media is striving to function as a watchdog and a criti-
cal public eye and mostly so in its self-defensive interest. Meanwhile, un-
derstanding of the media powers as the fourth estate is mythologized, vis-
ibly exaggerated and enjoyed by itself in an unreserved manner [Bonckute 
2009]. The media is supposed to perform as a substitute (of a political 
class, of the system of justice, of the intellectual analysis, etc.) role. Such a 
substitution process might thrive if media credibility is high [Gross, 2004, 
p. 120]. This condition is still amply met in Lithuania (although with de-
creasing preponderance). This extremely high trust in the TV broadcasted 
news was approaching the situation where the press and TV screen with 
its ever changing content becomes the most important morally substan-
tial part of the public life [Kavolis, 1997, p. 13–15]. It had to happen some 
new political and social values re-ordering events, to make public trust in 
mass media decrease from high trust ranging from 57–70% in 1996–2003 
(distrust ranging from 8 to 15%) to more common in democratic sur-
roundings trust in media ranging from 42 to 54% in 2003–2009 (distrust 
ranging from 16 to 27%). In Lithuania it occurred in late 2003-early 2004 
when President Paksas has been impeached because of his allegedly cor-
rupt practices and illegal political campaign finances [Norkus 2008]. In 
the presidential scandal the mass-media played an amazingly controver-
sial role. Majority of the dailies and TV stations allied themselves against 
President Paksas (they joined the accusing part of the established elite, 
widely criticized in the populist president statements). Meanwhile, nu-
merous segments of the mass-media displayed the strangest anti-Semitic, 
xenophobic and other attention distracting pieces of information. This 
dualistic mass-media milking of a story for all its worth, where the jour-
nalists were taking sides along the lines of competing political elite and 
avoiding to produce any public-interest related analysis, finally led to rela-
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tive disillusionment of the audience vis-à-vis the mass-media (which still 
remains a rather well trusted public institution in Lithuania). 
However, apart of the fact that media credibility is a complex social phe-
nomenon, difficult to measure and interpret, the media credibility is only 
a temporary and partial background for substitution function to be per-
formed in a society by the media. After all, the substitute role suggests that 
the media are more powerful, more independent, and more determined 
to pursue their own interests through a professional culture of their own 
making than is clearly the case [Gross, 2004, p. 120]. Yet, from the observa-
tions exposed above follows that in post-communist Lithuania the journal-
ism professional culture is still in its nascent phase (if at all), and public 
actions and messages of the media are rather determined by leading media 
personalities, free market impulses and contingent political opportunities 
than by their professional culture. Therefore, the Lithuanian mass media 
functions in favorable conditions where it can set the news agenda accord-
ing to their own political and /or business interests. In a way, the success 
of mass-media to self-portray positively and impose itself as a trustworthy 
authority is partially due to the absence of structural barriers which failed 
to be produced because of the early uncoupling (too lose coupling?) of the 
political party – mass media systems. 
Data from the international survey INTUNE conducted in 2009 show 
(see Table 1) that the Lithuanian media elites have an exceptionally big role 
in the national decision making. In the ranking of influential elite’s seg-
ments, the Lithuanian media elites come on the second place (just after the 
experienced politicians). For instance, in Germany it is rated 6th (according 
to the country elites themselves, the German media elite’s influence on the 
process of national decision making lags far behind of the influence exer-
cised by leaders of the German banks, experienced politicians, leaders of 
big enterprises, leaders of big employers’ organizations and is sidestepped 
by the leaders of trade unions). In parallel, in Hungary the media elites’ in-
fluence on the national decision making process is ranked 4th (after, again, 
influence exercised by leaders of Hungarian banks, big enterprises and big 
employers’ organizations). The fact that the Lithuanian media elites them-
selves evaluate their impact very highly (on 100 point scale, mean aver-
age of the Lithuanian media group evaluation of its own influence is 55,6 
compared to 58,7 of the Lithuanian national elites’ total evaluation, com-
pared to, respectively, 34,2 versus 46,5 in Germany and 32,6 versus 41,5 in 
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Hungary) highlights the specificity of the big power of Lithuanian media 
elites on national decision making agenda. 
Table 1: Influence of different segments of national elites on decision making in a 
country. Comparison of Lithuania, Germany and Hungary
 Evaluation rating scale: 0 – no influence at all, 100 huge influence. National elites’ survey data, 
January-March 2009. Group means (in the brackets mean of the self-evaluation of the reference 
group itself).
Segment of the national elite Lithuania Germany Hungary
Experienced parliamentarians 63,1 (62,8) 56,3 (69,0) 39,9 (40,4)
Leaders of mass-media 58,7 (55,6) 46,5 (34,2) 41,5 (32,6)
Leaders of employers‘ organizations 57,2 53,9 44
Leaders of banks 56,9 68,5 53,5
Leaders of big entreprise 54,9 54,2 47,8
Leaders of trade unions 43,3 (45,1) 47,6 (49,7) 39,4 (40,1)
Unexperienced parliamentarians 42,4 (46,6) 44,4 (39,5) 27,1 (26,2)
European parliamentarians 39,5 39,2 30,2
Ordinary citizens 23,5 26,8 13,1
 Source: FP6 INTUNE project survey January–June, 2009. A sample of media, trade0union and 
political elites in 17 EU countries and Serbia (for a full list of interviewed countries see www.
intune.it) were asked to give their answers to a pool of structured questions related to elites’ 
perceptions of decision making in national and European arenas. In each country elite sample 
consisted of 70 incumbent national lower house MPs, 35 representatives of media elite and 15 
leaders of national trade unions. The sample of media elites included the leaders of the largest 
(by audience or readership) dailies, weeklies, TV and radio stations, internet news portals, inf-
luential public intellectuals and political commentators as well as key figures of the media pro-
fessional representation in the country. The sample of political elites was selected proportionally 
according to seniority, gender, age, party and tenure in the parliament. At least 15–25 senior 
(frontbench) politicians such as (former or present) ministers, junior ministers, presidents and 
vice presidents of the house, parliamentary groups and standing committees as well as (for-
mer or present) EU commissioners were included in each country’s sample. In countries having 
smaller parliaments, such as Estonia, Lithuania or Belgium, the quota of 70 political elites was 
achieved by approaching each and every MP starting from the senior politicians. 
Instead of contributing to the societal democratization (Splichal 1994), 
i.e. motivating marginal and de-privileged groups and individuals to 
participate, to engage with the social matters, and to make their views re-
flected in media’s discourse, the Lithuanian media people are known for 
coining and firmly introducing into the public discourse the dichotomy 
of elite vs. beets (elitas vs. runkeliai), plainly favoring those speakers and 
interlocutors who have established social (political and media) positions 
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vis-à-vis those disadvantaged and/or aspiring to be heard and listened to. 
The Lithuanian media is far from the ideal democratic with the defini-
tive goal of openness, which in journalism means broad public empow-
erment. It is not by a chance that the media elites in Lithuania see their 
impact on national decision making process 2.4 times bigger than the 
impact of ordinary citizens (compared to 1.3 difference in Germany, see 
Table 13).
Further, on the presumed substitute role of the mass media, Gross 
writes: “the counter-power role is far removed from an adversarial role 
in the Western sense of the concept (…) Eastern European media’s ad-
versarial role is generally politically partisan rather than independent” 
(Gross, 2004, p. 120). Indeed, debates and publically displayed arguments 
of the post-communist Lithuanian mass-media are clearly bounded to 
multiple economic and political interests. In waters of the ill-structured 
political field in Lithuania twenty years after the break-down of commu-
nism [Ramonaite 2009], the mass media, criticizing each and every step 
of the politicians, is fishing its best prey. 
Yet, there is a huge failure in logics of the media is to claim and be a 
counter-power in every situation. The very notion is absurd, for if things 
really happen in this way, and if the governments invariably deserve to be 
opposed and confronted, it would stand for a sufficient reason to despair 
of democracy, for it would mean that a democratically elected govern-
ment is always mistaken, and therefore that the people electing it are af-
flicted with a congenial, incurable idiocy [Revel, 1991, p. 237]. The above 
mentioned President Paksas’ impeachment scandal was the closest ap-
proximation of such a mass media led counter-power action in Lithuania. 
It significantly contributed (mostly, through the above analyzed decrease 
in the public trust in media) to the ever-confused media mingle, gene-
rating its own patterns of social action, enjoying and expanding its au-
tonomy from the representative politics. 
The media plays less than a salutary role in the political, socio-cultural, 
and commercial realms by contributing to confusion, a sense of uncertain-
3 As to the specificity of the Hungarian civic disempowerment, which leads that ordinary citi-
zens’ impact on national decision making is evaluated – similarly to the Lithuanian pattern – as 
2.5 times lower that the Hungarian media elite’s influence, yet the Hungarian citizens’ impact 
on national decision making in general is considered being much lower (twice, if compared to 
Lithuania and Germany), see academic analysis of the democratic elitism developments in the 
country, for instance, Matonyte and Varnagy (2008). 
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ty, and misunderstanding of what democracy and market economy are giv-
en their tendentious, politicized (yet, without any clear political affinities) 
reporting and analysis. Such media stances are vividly counterproductive 
to helping establish new cultures of tolerance, trust, and respect for facts 
[Gross, 2004, p. 121]. Civil society’s growth in such conditions might only 
be provoked (but not stimulated) by the mass media as a civil self-defensive 
reaction against all kinds of demagoguery (be it political leadership and 
media people driven). This is not a ‘normal’ civil society evolution under 
conditions of democracy. 
Conclusions 
The revolutionary role of the post-communist mass-media in Lithuania 
is undeniable. The revolutionary years (1988-1992) were those when the 
media closely mirrored the political climate in place. In that period po-
litical mass mobilization exploded, so did the appeal of the various mass-
media outlets and political entrepreneurs. The mass-media frankly con-
veyed the bewildering array of socio-political and cultural choices, open 
for a country under democratization. However, the Lithuanian mass-me-
dia soon embarked upon the liberal (mostly understood, as commercial) 
model of development. 
The contemporary mass society phenomena, coupled with the ill-
structured post-communist political field and peculiar traditions and 
contingencies of the Lithuanian political culture and public sphere, gave 
birth to the odd situation where mass-media in unclear waters is fishing 
its commercially based (interest group defined) profits. In the conditions 
of the relative absence of foreign ownership of the mass-media outlets in 
Lithuania (striking in the context of press and TV hugely ‘colonized’ by 
the foreign owners in other post-communist countries), the local media 
barons in Lithuania produce and impose their own agendas, which ham-
per development of the civic-minded public sphere and obstruct defini-
tion of the social and professional responsibilities of the journalism as a 
profession and as a social category. 
In a strikingly un-civic manner, when clashes between media promo-
ted and political elite supported ideas and principles occur, the Lithuanian 
journalism comfortably portrays the politicians as the main threat to the 
freedom of speech, and thus provokes desirable shifts in public opinion, 
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favorable to the mass-media. Social success of those manipulative actions 
of mass-media is grounded in weak civil society, fed by post-traumatic 
social memories, (latently) present in a society, recovering after years of 
censorship and narrow interpretation of politics as a battle-field. The 
Lithuanian mass-media and government relations are defined along lines 
of the zero-sum game: they seek to control each other, and at the same 
time try to avoid being controlled by the other, while any other pattern of 
inter-relations does not appear as viable and appropriate. The media elite is 
skeptical about the whole government media policy and intolerant to dis-
cussions of its own role. The post-communist Lithuanian media freedom 
remains distorted by those aggressively seeking to dominate in the public 
sphere, without contributing to its pluralism and public-mindedness.
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Lietuvoje: nuo liberalios – grobuoniškos  
žiniasklaidos link 
Santrauka
Komunikacinė demokratija suvokiama kaip laisva, atvira ir demokratiška 
komunikacija tarp trijų vienodai legitimių viešųjų aktorių – politikų, žurnalistų 
ir viešosios nuomonės. Populizmas suprantamas kaip gera, teikianti malonumo, 
paveiki (efektyvi) politinė komunikacija su žmonėmis (liaudimi), pažeidžianti 
esmines politinių partijų (politinių konfliktų institucionalizacijos) ir politikų 
(atstovavimo) funkcijas. Straipsnyje pateikiamos įžvalgos apie tai, kokie pavo-
jai kyla demokratijos kokybei, jei laisva žiniasklaida visiškai išvengia politinio 
paralelizmo (Hallin, Mancini). Akcentuojamos Lietuvos žiniasklaidos elito 
tiesioginio aktyvumo politikoje tendencijos. Didelis pasitikėjimo žiniasklaida 
nuosmūkis (trečdaliu) per pastarąjį dešimtmetį (1998–2009) interpretuojamas 
kaip bendras rezultatas pokomunistinio menkai struktūruoto politinio lauko, 
veikiamo liberalizacijos ir demokratizacijos procesų, kuriuos Lietuvoje sustipri-
no savitos politinės kultūros ir viešosios erdvės patirtys ir tradicijos. Lietuvoje 
dėl santykinai aukšto pasitikėjimo žiniasklaida ir menko užsienio kapitalo da-
lyvavimo  žiniasklaidos versle, vietiniai baronai gali kurti ir primesti žiniasklai-
dos interesus atspindinčią viešąją darbotvarkę. Lietuvos žiniasklaidos ir politi-
nės valdžios par excellence santykiai rutuliojasi pagal nulinės sumos žaidimo 
principus: vieni kitus mėgina kontroliuoti ir tuo pačiu metu siekia išvengti būti 
kontroliuojamais ir tuo tarpu kiti žiniasklaidos ir politines valdžios tarpusavio 
santykių modeliai neatrodo nei įmanomi, nei priimtini. INTUNE projekto ap-
klausa (2009) rodo, kad Lietuvoje žiniasklaidos elito įtaka nacionalinių spren-
dimų priėmimo procesui yra žymiai didesnė negu, pavyzdžiui, Vokietijoje ar 
Vengrijoje. 
Raktiniai žodžiai: populizmas, komunikacinė demokratija, žiniasklaidos 
nuosavybė/savininkai, viešoji erdvė, pasitikėjimas viešosiomis institucijomis.  
